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The Sending-or-Not-Sending protocol of the twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) has
its advantage of unconditional security proof under any coherent attack and fault tolerance to large
misalignment error. So far this is the only coherent-state based TF-QKD protocol that has consid-
ered finite-key effect, the statistical fluctuations. Here we consider the complete finite-key effects
for the protocol and we show by numerical simulation that the protocol with typical finite number
of pulses in practice can produce unconditional secure final key under general attack, including all
coherent attacks. It can exceed the secure distance of 500 km in typical finite number of pulses in
practice even with a large misalignment error.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) could provide un-
conditionally secure communication [1–8] of two parties,
Alice and Bob. But the security in ideal case [5–8]
dose not guarantee the security in practice [9–17]. For-
tunately, the decoy-state method [18–40] could help us
beating the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [9–13]
and guarantee the security with imperfect light sources.
Besides decoy-state mehtod, there are other protocols
such as RRDPS protocol [41, 42] proposed to beat
PNS attack. Measurement-device-independent (MDI)-
QKD [43, 44] can solve all possible loopholes of detec-
tion. And the decoy-state MDI-QKD [45–58] protocol
could help us ensure the security of protocol performed
by imperfect light sources and detectors.
The 4-intensity protocol [57] together with the joint-
constraints [56] has greatly improved the key rate and
distance of the MDI-QKD. Using this protocol, a dis-
tance exceeding 400 km has been experimentally demon-
strated [52] for the MDI-QKD. However, the key rate
of all the prior art decoy-state protocols and the MDI-
QKD protocols protocols cannot be better than the linear
scale of the channel transmittance. It cannot exceed the
known bound of the repeaterless QKD, such as the PLOB
bound [59] or the TGW bound [60]. Recently, a QKD
protocol named Twin-Field (TF) QKD was proposed [61]
whose key rate R ∼ O(√η), where η is the channel
transmittance, and thus has attracted much attention.
But the later announcement of the phase information in
Ref. [61] will casuse security loopholes [62, 63], and many
variants of TF-QKD have been proposed [63–69] to close
∗Email Address: xbwang@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
†Also at Center for Atomic and Molecular Nanosciences, Tsinghua
University, Beijing 100084, China
the loophole. A series of experiments [70–73] have been
done to demonstrate those protocols. In particular, an
efficient protocol for TF-QKD through sending-or-not-
sending (SNS protocol) has been given in Ref. [63]. The
SNS protocol has been experimentally demonstrated in
proof-of-principle in Ref. [70], and realized in real opti-
cal fiber with the effects of statistical fluctuation being
taken [71]. The unconditional security of SNS protocol in
the asymptotic case has been proved [63] and SNS proto-
col relaxes the requirement for single photon interference
accuracy. The key rate of SNS is still considerable even
if the misalignment error is as large as 35%. Among all
those variants of TF QKD with coherent states, the SNS
QKD protocol is the only one that takes the effect of
statistical fluctuation and finite decoy states into consid-
eration [68]. Here we show an analysis of the complete
effect of finite-key size of SNS QKD protocol.
The main tool we use to analyse the effect of finite-
key size is the universally composable framework [74].
An complete QKD protocol usually includes the prepa-
ration and distribution of quantum states, measurement
of received quantum states, parameter estimation, error
correction and private amplification. After the error cor-
rection step, Alice gets a bit string S, and Bob get an
estimate string S′ of S. If the error rate is too large, the
results of error correction is an empty string and the pro-
tocol aborts. A protocol is called εcor-correct if the prob-
ability that S and S′ aren’t the same, Pr(S 6= S′) ≤ εcor.
Besides, the quantum state of Alice may be attacked
by Eve in the distribution and measurement steps and
some information would be leaked to Eve. To ensure
the security of final secret keys, Alice and Bob apply
a privacy amplification scheme based on two-universal
hashing [75] to extract two shorter strings of length l
from S and S′. We denote the density operator of the
2system of Alice and Eve as ρAE . If
min
ρE
1
2
‖ ρAE − UA ⊗ ρE ‖≤ εsec, (1)
where UA denotes the fully mixed state of Alice’s system
of strings of length l and ρE is the density operator of
Eve’s system, the protocol is called εsec-secret [54, 76, 77].
According to the composable framework, a protocol is
called ε-secure if it is both εcor-correct and εsec-secret,
and ε ≤ εcor + εsec.
This paper is arranged as follows. In Sec. II, we intro-
duce the main results of the effect of finite-key size. And
in Sec. III, we present our numerical simulation results.
The article ends with some concluding remarks. The de-
tails of calculation are shown in the Methods part.
II. THE EFFECT OF FINITE-KEY SIZE OF SNS
PROTOCOL
As shown in Ref. [63], there are two windows in SNS
protocol, the X˜ windows and the Z windows. In a Z
window, Alice (Bob) randomly decides to send a phase-
radomized coherent state |√µzeiθA〉 (|√µzeiθB 〉) with a
probability p, or sends nothing (a vacuum state |0〉). In
an X˜ window (note that the X˜ window defined here is a
slightly different from the definition of the X window in
Ref. [63], thus we use a different symbol.), Alice and Bob
randomly send out a phase-randomized coherent state.
The X˜ windows are decoy windows and will be used to
estimate the counting rate s1 and phase-flip error rate e
ph
1
of the single photon state |01〉 or |10〉 that Alice decides
sending and Bob decides not sending or Alice decides not
sending and Bob decides sending in the Z windows. The
asymptotic case is considered in Ref. [63], and there are
infinite intensities in X˜ windows and infinite pulses in
the whole protocol, thus s1 and e
ph
1 could be estimated
exactly.
Alice and Bob send their prepared pulses to Charlie,
and Charlie is assumed to perform interferometric mea-
surements on the received pulses and announces the mea-
surement result to Alice and Bob. If one and only one
detector clicks in the measurement process, Charlie will
also announce whether the left detector or right detector
clicks. The effective events of Z windows and X˜ win-
dows are defined individually: it is an effective event of
Z windows if one and only one detector clicks; it is an
effective event of X˜ windows if one and only one detector
clicks and Alice and Bob send the coherent state with the
same intensity, and their phases satisfy the post-selection
criterion, which is
1− | cos (θA − θB − ψAB)| ≤ |λ|, (2)
where θA and θB are the phases of coherent states
prepared by Alice and Bob respectively, and ψAB can
take an arbitrary value which can be different from
time to time as Alice and Bob like, so as to obtain a
satisfactory key rate for the protocol [71]. Note that
1 − | cos [θA − θB − (γA − γB)]| ≤ |λ| according to the
security proof of Ref. [63] in the poset-selction criterion
there [63], both γA and γB can take arbitrary values
there [63]. However, in applying the criterion, we only
need the value γA− γB which is actually only one value.
Thus we could just use ψAB in Eq. (2) here. The value
of λ is decided by the size of phase slice, ∆, that Alice
and Bob choose [61]. The Eq. (2) is equivalent to
|θA− θB −ψAB| ≤ ∆
2
, |θA− θB −ψAB − pi| ≤ ∆
2
. (3)
Same with that in Ref. [68], here |x| means the degree of
the minor angle enclosed by the two rays that enclose the
rotational angle of degree x, e.g., | − 15pi/8| = |15pi/8| =
pi/8, | − pi/10| = pi/10.
The phases of coherent states in Z windows are never
be announced in the public channel, thus the coher-
ent states in Z windows are phase-randomized coherent
states which are equivalent to classical mixture of differ-
ent photon numbers. Only the effective events of single-
photon states in those Z windows that Alice decides send-
ing and Bob decides not sending or Alice decides not
sending and Bob decides sending, are untagged events,
thus we have the following formula of final key rate
R = 2p(1− p)µze−µzs1[1− h(eph1 )]− fSzh(Ez), (4)
where Sz is the counting rate of pulses in Z windows and
Ez is the corresponding error rate, h(x) = −x log2 x−(1−
x) log2 (1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy function, f
is the error correction inefficiency, and s1 and e
ph
1 are
defined in the beginning of this section.
However, the number of pulses is finite in practice and
thus there can not be infinite intensities in X˜ windows.
Here we consider the four-intensity decoy state SNS pro-
tocol [68]. In each time, Alice and Bob randomly choose
the decoy window or signal window with probabilities
1 − pz and pz. If the decoy window is chosen, Alice
(Bob) randomly chooses vacuum state |0〉, |eiδA√µ1〉 or
|eiδ′A√µ2〉 (vacuum state |0〉, |eiδB√µ1〉 or |eiδ′B√µ2〉)
with probabilities p0, p1 and 1−p0−p1 respectively, where
δ is random in [0, 2pi). If the signal window is chosen, Al-
ice (Bob) randomly chooses vacuum state |0〉, or phase-
randomized weak coherent state of intensity µz, with
probabilities pz0 and 1 − pz0. Then Alice and Bob pre-
pare the chosen states and send them to Charlie. Charlie
is assumed to perform interferometric measurements on
the received quantum signals and announces the mea-
surement result to Alice and Bob. If one and only one
detector clicks in the measurement process, Charlie will
also announces whether the left detector or right detec-
tor clicks. Then Alice and Bob will take it as an one-
detector heralded event. After Alice and Bob repeat the
above steps for N times, they perform the following data
post-processing steps.
1. Sifting. If both Alice and Bob choose the signal win-
dow, it is a Z window. If both Alice and Bob choose
3the decoy window, it is an X˜ window. Besides, we define
that if both Alice and Bob decide to send the phase-
randomized coherent state with intensity µ1, as X1 win-
dow, which is a subset of X˜ windows. According to the
criterion introduced in the beginning of this section, Alice
and Bob decide whether an one-detector heralded event is
an effective event. We define three kinds of sets, Z,X1,
and X2. The set Z includes all effective events in Z
windows. The set X1 includes all effective events in X1
windows. And the set X2 includes all other one-detector
heralded events.
2. Parameter estimation. For the events in the set Z,
Alice will denote it as bit 0 if she sends a vacuum state,
and denote it as bit 1 if she sends a phased-randomized
weak coherent state. In the same time, Bob will denote
it as bit 1 if he sends a vacuum state, and denote it as bit
0 if he sends a phased-randomized weak coherent state.
Finally Alice and Bob form the nt-bit strings Zs and
Z ′s according to the events in set Z. Then through the
decoy-state method, Alice and Bob estimate n1 according
to the events in X2 and estimate eph1 according the events
in set X1, where n1 is the lower bound of bits caused by
untagged events in Zs or Z
′
s, and e
ph
1 is the upper bound
of phase-flip error rate of the untagged bits. The details
of how to calculate n1 and e
ph
1 are shown in the Methods
part.
3. Error correction. Alice and Bob perform an in-
formation reconciliation scheme to correct Z ′s, and Bob
will obtain an estimate Zˆs of Zs from Z
′
s. To achieve
this goal, Alice sends Bob leakEC bits of error correc-
tion data. Then Alice computes a hash of Zs of length
log2 (1/εcor) using a random universal hash function, and
she sends the hash and hash function to Bob [75]. If the
hash that Bob computes is the same with Alice, the prob-
ability that Zs and Zˆs aren’t the same, Pr(Zs 6= Zˆs), is
less than εcor. If the hash that Bob computes is not the
same with Alice, the protocol aborts.
4. Private amplification. Alice and Bob apply a pri-
vacy amplification scheme based on two-universal hash-
ing [75] to extract two shorter strings of length l from
Zs and Zˆs. Alice and Bob obtain strings ZPA and ZˆPA
which is the final secret key after privacy amplification.
The protocol is εcor-correct if the error correction step
is passed. If the final length of secret keys, l, satisfies
l =n1[1 − h(eph1 )]− leakEC − log2
2
εcor
− 2 log2
1√
2εPAεˆ
,
(5)
the protocol is εsec-secret. And according to the compos-
able framework, the security coefficient of the whole pro-
tocol is εtol = εcor+εsec, where εsec = 2εˆ+4ε¯+εPA+εn1 .
Here, εcor is the failure probability of error correction; ε¯
is the accuracy of estimating the smooth min-entropy,
which is also the failure probability that the real value
of eph1 isn’t in the bound that we estimate; εPA is the
failure probability of privacy amplification; εn1 is the
pd e0 ed ηd f αf ξ
1.0 × 10−10 0.5 15% 80.0% 1.1 0.2 1.0× 10−10
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numer-
ical simulations. Here pd: the dark count rate of Char-
lie’s detectors; e0: error rate of the vacuum count; ed: the
misalignment-error probability; ηd: the detection efficiency of
Charlie’s detectors; f : the error correction inefficiency; αf :
the fiber loss coefficient (dB/km); ξ: the failure probability
of statistical fluctuation analysis.
failure probability that the real value of n1 isn’t in the
bound that we estimate. The value of leakEC is related
to the specific error correction schemes, and in general
leakEC = fnth(Ez), where Ez is the error rate of strings
Zs and Z
′
s.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
If an experiment of SNS protocol is done, we can
first calculate the lower and upper bound of 〈Sjk〉 with
Eqs. (13), (17)-(21) from their observed values. And
we can get the upper bound of 〈T∆〉 in a similar way.
Then we can get the lower bound of 〈sZ1 〉 and the up-
per bound of 〈eph1 〉 with Eqs. (15) and (16). Then we
can get the lower bound of n1 and the upper bound of
eph1 with Eqs (22)-(26). Finally, we can get how many
bits of secret keys we could extract from this experiment
with Eq. (5). The problem is that we do not have such
observed values and we need to simulate what values we
would observe in the experiment with the experimental
parameters list in Table. I. All symbols appearing in this
paragraph is defined in Sec. IVB.
We use the linear model to simulate the observed val-
ues of experiment with the experimental parameters list
in Table. I. Without loss of generality, we assume the
distance between Alice and Charlie and the distance be-
tween Bob and Charlie are the same, and we assume
the property of Charlie’s two detectors are the same.
The total transmittance of the experiment set-ups is
η = 10−L/100ηd, where L is the distance between Al-
ice and Bob. The simulation of those observed values
are shown in Sec. IVC, which are related to η and other
parameters list in Table. I.
Here we set εcor = εˆ = εPA = ξ, ε¯ = 4ξ and εn1 =
4ξ, and thus security coefficient of the whole protocol
is εtol = 24ξ = 2.4 × 10−9. The reason we set ε¯ = 4ξ
and εn1 = 4ξ is that we use the Chernoff bound for four
times to estimate eph1 and n1 (Notice that we could handle
〈S01〉, 〈S10〉 and 〈S02〉, 〈S20〉 together in Eq. (13)). In
order to fairly compare the performance of generating
final keys of different total pulse numbers, N , we define
the key rate of per sending pulse, R = l/N .
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 are our simulation results of this
work and Ref. [68] with the experimental parameters list
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FIG. 1: The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus transmission
distance (the distance between Alice and Bob) with the results
of this work and Ref. [68] under the experimental parameters
listed in Table I. The dashed lines are results of Ref. [68] and
the solid lines are the results of this work. Here we simulate
three groups of results where N = 1× 1014 , 1× 1012 , 1× 1010 .
Here the red solid line is the PLOB bound.
in Table. I. The only difference of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 is that
ed = 15% in Fig. 1 and ed = 20% in Fig. 2. The results
of this work and Ref. [68] is almost overlap while we set
N = 1× 1014, but the difference of the results is obvious
while we set N = 1 × 1010, especially in the end of the
lines. Still, the secure distance of SNS protocol can still
reach up to 500 km with 20% misalignment error and
1 × 1012 total pulses, even if we take all the effects of
finite-key size into consideration.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 are our simulation results of another
two groups of experimental parameters. We set pd =
1 × 10−8 and ed = 5% in Fig. 3 and pd = 1 × 10−9 and
ed = 5% in Fig. 4. The other experimental parameters we
use are listed in Table I. Same with Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, we
simulate three groups of results where N = 1× 1014, 1×
1012, 1× 1010. Comparing Fig. 3 with Fig. 4, we can find
that the secure distances are improved at most 100 km
if the dark count is reduced by an order of magnitude.
Still, the complete effect of finite size is reflected in the
end of lines especially when the total number of pulses,
N , is relatively small.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show an analysis of the finite-key size
effect of SNS protocol and get the relation of final key
length l and the security coefficient, as shown in Eq. (5).
Eq. (5) is derived by the method proposed in Ref. [77],
and thus it can produce unconditional secure final key
under general attack, including all coherent attacks. The
numerical results show that the secure distance of SNS
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FIG. 2: The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus transmission
distance (the distance between Alice and Bob) with the results
of this work and Ref. [68] under the experimental parameters
listed in Table I, except we set ed = 20%. The dashed lines
are results of Ref. [68] and the solid lines are the results of
this work. Here we simulate three groups of results where
N = 1× 1014, 1× 1012, 1× 1010. Here the red solid line is the
PLOB bound.
protocol can still reach up to 500 km with 20% misalign-
ment error and 1 × 1012 total pulses, even if we take
all the effects of finite-key size into consideration. This
clearly shows that the SNS protocol [63] of TF-QKD is
on the one hand secure under general attack, i.e., as se-
cure as the existing decoy-state MDI-QKD, on the other
hand more efficient than the existing decoy-state MDI-
QKD by many orders of magnitudes in key rate at long
distance domain.
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Methods
A. The relation of the length of final key and εsec
In this protocol, any attack to quantum channel and
detectors is allowed only if it doesn’t break the rules of
quantum mechanics, and we call the attacker as Eve. We
denote the system of Eve after error correction as E′.
If Alice and Bob apply a privacy amplification scheme
based on two-universal hashing to extract two shorter
strings of length l from Zs, the protocol is εsec-secret [75,
50 100 200 300 400 500 60010
−12
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
Distance L (km))
K
ey
 ra
te
s (
pe
r p
uls
e)
 
 
Ref.[68] N=1E14
This work N=1E14
Ref.[68] N=1E12
This work N=1E12
Ref.[68] N=1E10
This work N=1E10
PLOB Bound
FIG. 3: The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus transmission
distance (the distance between Alice and Bob) with the results
of this work and Ref. [68]. Here we set pd = 1 × 10
−8 and
ed = 5%, the other experimental parameters we use are listed
in Table I. The dashed lines are results of Ref. [68] and the
solid lines are the results of this work. Here we simulate three
groups of results where N = 1× 1014, 1× 1012, 1× 1010. Here
the red solid line is the PLOB bound.
78]
εsec ≤ 2ε+ 1
2
√
2l−H
ε
min(Zs|E
′), (6)
where Hεmin(Zs|E′) is the ε-smooth min entropy. It mea-
sures the max probability of guessing Zs right giving E
′.
E′ could be decomposed as CE, where C is the system
of leakage information while Alice and Bob perform er-
ror correction and E is the system of Eve before error
correction. According to the chain rules [75], we have
Hεmin(Zs|E′) ≥ Hεmin(Zs|E)− |C|, (7)
where |C| < leakEC + log2( 2εcor ). And we could decom-
pose the string Zs as Z1Zrest, where Z1 is the bits caused
by untagged-photon events and Zrest is the other bits of
Zs [54]. Thus according to the chain rules [79], we have
Hεmin(Zs|E) ≥H ε¯min(Z1|ZrestE) +Hε
′
min(Zrest|E)
− 2 log2
√
2
εˆ
,
(8)
where ε = 2ε¯+ ε′ + εˆ and Hε
′
min(Zrest|E) ≥ 0.
Besides, we denote X basis as { 12 (|01〉 +
eiθ|10〉), 12 (|01〉 − eiθ|10〉)} and Z basis as {|01〉, |10〉},
where θ can be an arbitary value. To get the lower bound
of H ε¯min(Z1|ZrestE), we need to use the uncertainty
relation of smooth min and max entropy [77, 80]. It
says that if the untagged-photon states prepared in
X basis and Z basis are orthogonal unbiased, and
if the states originally prepared and measured under
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FIG. 4: The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus transmission
distance (the distance between Alice and Bob) with the results
of this work and Ref. [68]. Here we set pd = 1 × 10
−9 and
ed = 5%, the other experimental parameters we use are listed
in Table I. The dashed lines are results of Ref. [68] and the
solid lines are the results of this work. Here we simulate three
groups of results where N = 1× 1014, 1× 1012, 1× 1010. Here
the red solid line is the PLOB bound.
the Z-basis are now prepared and measured under the
X-basis and obtained strings Xs1 and X
′
s1 by Alice and
Bob respectively, then we have
H ε¯min(Z1|ZrestE) ≥ n1 −H ε¯max(Xs1|X ′s1)
≥ n1 − n1h(eph1 ).
(9)
Finally we have
Hεmin(Zs|E′) ≥n1[1− h(eph1 )]− leakEC
− log2
2
εcor
− 2 log2
√
2
εˆ
.
(10)
Combining Eqs. (5), (6) and (10) and setting ε′ = 0, we
have
εsec ≤ 2εˆ+ 4ε¯+ εPA. (11)
Finally, containing the failure probability that the real
value of n1 isn’t in the bound that we estimate, εn1 , we
have
εsec ≤ 2εˆ+ 4ε¯+ εPA + εn1 . (12)
B. The calculation method of n1 and e
ph
1
The method we use here is similar with Ref. [68].
In an X˜ window with different intensities from Alice
and Bob, they don’t announce any phase information
in the protocol, therefore the coherent states sent out
from each sides can be regarded as classical mixture of
6different photon numbers. We denote ρ = |0〉〈0|, ρ1 =∑
k=0
µk1e
−µ1
k! |k〉〈k|, ρ2 =
∑
k=0
µk2e
−µ2
k! |k〉〈k| and ρz =∑
k=0
µkz
k! |k〉〈k|, where ρ1 and ρ2 are the density operator
of the coherent states used here in X˜ windows. And this
also applies to Bob’s quantum state. In the whole proto-
col, Alice and Bob obtain Njk(jk = {00, 01, 02, 10, 20})
instances when Alice sends state ρj and Bob sends state
ρk. And after the sifted step, Alice and Bob obtain njk
one-detector heralded events. We denote the counting
rate of source jk as Sjk = njk/Njk. With all those defi-
nitions, we have
N00 =[(1− pz)2p20 + 2(1− pz)pzp0pz0]N,
N01 =N10 = [(1 − pz)2p0p1 + (1− pz)pzpz0p1]N,
N02 =N20 = [(1 − pz)2(1 − p0 − p1)p0
+ (1− pz)pzpz0(1− p0 − p1)]N.
(13)
Besides, we need define two new subsets of X1 win-
dows, C∆+ and C∆− , to estimate the upper bound of
eph1 . C∆+ contains all the instance that both Alice and
Bob prepare |eiδA√µ1〉 and |eiδB√µ1〉 and |δA−δB| ≤ ∆2 .
C∆− contains all the instance that both Alice and Bob
prepare |eiδA√µ1〉 and |eiδB√µ1〉 and |δA− δB−pi| ≤ ∆2 .
Same with that in Ref. [68], here |x| means the degree of
the minor angle enclosed by the two rays that enclose the
rotational angle of degree x, e.g., | − 15pi/8| = |15pi/8| =
pi/8, | − pi/10| = pi/10. The number of instances in C∆±
is
N∆± =
∆
2pi
(1− pz)2p21N. (14)
We denote the number of effective events of right de-
tectors responding from C∆+ as n
R
∆+ , and the number
of effective events of left detectors responding from C∆−
as nL∆− . And we get the counting error rate of C∆± ,
T∆ =
nR
∆+
+nL
∆−
2N
∆±
.
If we denote the expected value of the counting rate of
untagged photons as 〈sZ1 〉, the lower bound of 〈sZ1 〉 is
〈sZ1 〉 ≥ 〈sZ1 〉 =
1
2µ1µ2(µ2 − µ1) [µ
2
2e
µ1(〈S01〉+ 〈S10〉)
− µ21eµ2(〈S02〉+ 〈S20〉)− 2(µ22 − µ21)〈S00〉],
(15)
where 〈Sjk〉 is the expected value of Sjk, and 〈Sjk〉 and
〈Sjk〉 are the upper bound and lower bound of 〈Sjk〉 when
we estimate the expected value from its observed value.
The expected value of the phase-flip error rate of the
untagged photons satisfies [68]
〈eph1 〉 ≤ 〈eph1 〉 =
〈T∆〉 − 12e−2µ1〈S00〉
2µ1e−2µ1〈sZ1 〉
. (16)
Here we use the fact that the error rate of vacuum state
is always 12 .
Chernoff bound. The formulas of 〈sZ1 〉 and 〈eph1 〉 are
represented by expected values, but the values we get
in experiment are observed values. To close the gap be-
tween the expected values and observed values, we need
Chernoff bound [58, 81]. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be n ran-
dom samples, detected with the value 1 or 0, and let
X denote their sum satisfying X =
∑n
i=1Xi. φ is the
expected value of X . We have
φL(X) =
X
1 + δ1(X)
, (17)
φU (X) =
X
1− δ2(X) , (18)
where we can obtain the values of δ1(X) and δ2(X) by
solving the following equations
(
eδ1
(1 + δ1)1+δ1
) X
1+δ1
=
ξ
2
, (19)(
e−δ2
(1− δ2)1−δ2
) X
1−δ2
=
ξ
2
, (20)
where ξ is the failure probability. Thus we have
φL(NjkSjk) = Njk〈Sjk〉, φU (NjkSjk) = Njk〈Sjk〉. (21)
Still Eqs. (15) and (16) are the lower bound of the ex-
pected values of the counting rate and the upper bound
of the phase flip error rate of single-photons. The final
question is what their real values are in this specific ex-
periment, and we need the Chernoff bound to help us esti-
mate their real values from their expected values. Similar
to Eqs. (17)- (20), the observed value, ϕ, and its expected
value, Y , satisfy
ϕU (Y ) = [1 + δ′1(Y )]Y, (22)
ϕL(Y ) = [1− δ′2(Y )]Y, (23)
where we can obtain the values of δ′1(Y ) and δ
′
2(Y ) by
solving the following equations(
eδ
′
1
(1 + δ′1)
1+δ′1
)Y
=
ξ
2
, (24)
(
e−δ
′
2
(1− δ′2)1−δ′2
)Y
=
ξ
2
. (25)
We define N1 = 2p
2
zpz0(1 − pz0)µze−µzN , and we
have [68]
n1 = ϕ
L(N1〈sZ1 〉), eph1 =
ϕU (N1〈sZ1 〉〈eph1 〉)
N1〈sZ1 〉
. (26)
This ends the estimate of n1 and e
ph
1 .
7C. The simulation of observed values
We use the linear model to simulate the observed val-
ues of experiment with the experimental parameters list
in Table. I. Without loss of generality, we assume the
distance between Alice and Charlie and the distance be-
tween Bob and Charlie are the same, and we assume the
properties of Charlie’s two detectors are the same. If the
total transmittance of the experiment set-ups is η, then
we have
n00 = 2pd(1− pd)N00,
n01 = n10 = 2[(1− pd)eηµ1/2 − (1− pd)2e−ηµ1 ]N01,
n02 = n20 = 2[(1− pd)eηµ2/2 − (1− pd)2e−ηµ2 ]N02,
nt = nsignal + nerror,
Ez =
nerror
nt
,
nR∆+ = n
L
∆− = [TX(1− 2ed) + edSX ]N∆± ,
where N00, N01, N10, N02, N20, N∆± are defined in
Eqs. (13) and (14) and
nsignal =4Np
2
zpz0(1− pz0)[(1 − pd)e−ηµz/2
− (1− pd)2e−2ηµz ],
nerror =2Np
2
z(1− pz0)2[(1− pd)e−ηµzI0(ηµz)
− (1− pd)2e−2ηµz ] + 2Np2zp2z0pd(1− pd),
TX =
1
∆
∫ ∆
2
−∆
2
(1− pd)e−2ηµ1 cos
2 δ
2 dδ
− (1− pd)2e−2ηµ1 ,
SX =
1
∆
∫ ∆
2
−∆
2
(1− pd)e−2ηµ1 sin
2 δ
2 dδ
− (1− pd)2e−2ηµ1 + TX ,
where I0(x) is the 0-order hyperbolic Bessel functions of
the first kind.
[1] C. BENNETT, in Proceedings of the IEEE International
Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Process-
ing (1984), pp. 175–179.
[2] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Re-
views of modern physics 74, 145 (2002).
[3] N. Gisin and R. Thew, Nature photonics 1, 165 (2007).
[4] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf,
M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, Reviews of mod-
ern physics 81, 1301 (2009).
[5] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Physical review letters 85,
441 (2000).
[6] M. Koashi, New Journal of Physics 11, 045018 (2009).
[7] K. Tamaki, M. Koashi, and N. Imoto, Physical review
letters 90, 167904 (2003).
[8] B. Kraus, N. Gisin, and R. Renner, Physical review let-
ters 95, 080501 (2005).
[9] B. Huttner, N. Imoto, N. Gisin, and T. Mor, Physical
Review A 51, 1863 (1995).
[10] H. P. Yuen, Quantum and Semiclassical Optics: Journal
of the European Optical Society Part B 8, 939 (1996).
[11] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders,
Physical Review Letters 85, 1330 (2000).
[12] N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Physical Review A 61, 052304 (2000).
[13] N. Lu¨tkenhaus and M. Jahma, New Journal of Physics
4, 44 (2002).
[14] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, Nature photonics 4, 686
(2010).
[15] I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurt-
siefer, and V. Makarov, Nature communications 2, 349
(2011).
[16] M. Hayashi, Physical Review A 76, 012329 (2007).
[17] V. Scarani and R. Renner, Physical review letters 100,
200501 (2008).
[18] W.-Y. Hwang, Physical Review Letters 91, 057901
(2003).
[19] X.-B. Wang, Physical Review Letters 94, 230503 (2005).
[20] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Physical review letters
94, 230504 (2005).
[21] X.-B. Wang, T. Hiroshima, A. Tomita, and M. Hayashi,
Physics reports 448, 1 (2007).
[22] D. Rosenberg, J. W. Harrington, P. R. Rice, P. A.
Hiskett, C. G. Peterson, R. J. Hughes, A. E. Lita, S. W.
Nam, and J. E. Nordholt, Physical review letters 98,
010503 (2007).
[23] T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, M. Fu¨rst, R. Ursin,
F. Tiefenbacher, T. Scheidl, J. Perdigues, Z. Sodnik,
C. Kurtsiefer, J. G. Rarity, et al., Physical Review Let-
ters 98, 010504 (2007).
[24] C.-Z. Peng, J. Zhang, D. Yang, W.-B. Gao, H.-X. Ma,
H. Yin, H.-P. Zeng, T. Yang, X.-B. Wang, and J.-W.
Pan, Physical review letters 98, 010505 (2007).
[25] S.-K. Liao, W.-Q. Cai, W.-Y. Liu, L. Zhang, Y. Li, J.-G.
Ren, J. Yin, Q. Shen, Y. Cao, Z.-P. Li, et al., Nature
549, 43 (2017).
[26] M. Peev, C. Pacher, R. Alle´aume, C. Barreiro, J. Bouda,
W. Boxleitner, T. Debuisschert, E. Diamanti, M. Dia-
nati, J. Dynes, et al., New Journal of Physics 11, 075001
(2009).
[27] T.-Y. Chen, J. Wang, H. Liang, W.-Y. Liu, Y. Liu,
X. Jiang, Y. Wang, X. Wan, W.-Q. Cai, L. Ju, et al.,
Optics express 18, 27217 (2010).
[28] M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H. Ishizuka, W. Klaus,
K. Wakui, M. Takeoka, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, Z. Wang,
A. Tanaka, et al., Optics express 19, 10387 (2011).
[29] B. Fro¨hlich, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, A. W. Sharpe,
Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Nature 501, 69 (2013).
[30] A. Boaron, G. Boso, D. Rusca, C. Vulliez, C. Autebert,
M. Caloz, M. Perrenoud, G. Gras, F. Bussie`res, M.-J. Li,
et al., Physical review letters 121, 190502 (2018).
[31] Q. Wang, W. Chen, G. Xavier, M. Swillo, T. Zhang,
S. Sauge, M. Tengner, Z.-F. Han, G.-C. Guo, and
A. Karlsson, Physical Review Letters 100, 090501
(2008).
8[32] X.-B. Wang, Physical Review A 72, 012322 (2005).
[33] Y. Adachi, T. Yamamoto, M. Koashi, and N. Imoto,
Physical review letters 99, 180503 (2007).
[34] X.-B. Wang, C.-Z. Peng, and J.-W. Pan, Applied physics
letters 90, 031110 (2007).
[35] X.-B. Wang, C.-Z. Peng, J. Zhang, L. Yang, and J.-W.
Pan, Physical Review A 77, 042311 (2008).
[36] X.-B. Wang, L. Yang, C.-Z. Peng, and J.-W. Pan, New
Journal of Physics 11, 075006 (2009).
[37] K. Tamaki, M. Curty, G. Kato, H.-K. Lo, and K. Azuma,
Physical Review A 90, 052314 (2014).
[38] Z.-W. Yu, Y.-H. Zhou, and X.-B. Wang, Physical Review
A 93, 032307 (2016).
[39] F. Xu, Y. Zhang, Z. Zhou, W. Chen, Z. Han, and G. Guo,
Physical Review A 80, 062309 (2009).
[40] H. F. Chau, Phys. Rev. A 97, 040301 (2018).
[41] T. Sasaki, Y. Yamamoto, and M. Koashi, Nature 509,
475 (2014).
[42] H. Takesue, T. Sasaki, K. Tamaki, and M. Koashi, Na-
ture Photonics 9, 827 (2015).
[43] S. L. Braunstein and S. Pirandola, Physical Review Let-
ters 108, 130502 (2012).
[44] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Physical Review Letters
108, 130503 (2012).
[45] X.-B. Wang, Physical Review A 87, 012320 (2013).
[46] A. Rubenok, J. A. Slater, P. Chan, I. Lucio-Martinez,
and W. Tittel, Physical Review Letters 111, 130501
(2013).
[47] Y. Liu, T.-Y. Chen, L.-J. Wang, H. Liang, G.-L. Shentu,
J. Wang, K. Cui, H.-L. Yin, N.-L. Liu, L. Li, et al., Phys-
ical Review Letters 111, 130502 (2013).
[48] Z. Tang, Z. Liao, F. Xu, B. Qi, L. Qian, and H.-K. Lo,
Physical Review Letters 112, 190503 (2014).
[49] Y.-L. Tang, H.-L. Yin, S.-J. Chen, Y. Liu, W.-J. Zhang,
X. Jiang, L. Zhang, J. Wang, L.-X. You, J.-Y. Guan,
et al., Physical Review Letters 113, 190501 (2014).
[50] C. Wang, X.-T. Song, Z.-Q. Yin, S. Wang, W. Chen, C.-
M. Zhang, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Physical Review
Letters 115, 160502 (2015).
[51] L. Comandar, M. Lucamarini, B. Fro¨hlich, J. Dynes,
A. Sharpe, S.-B. Tam, Z. Yuan, R. Penty, and A. Shields,
Nature Photonics 10, 312 (2016).
[52] H.-L. Yin, T.-Y. Chen, Z.-W. Yu, H. Liu, L.-X. You, Y.-
H. Zhou, S.-J. Chen, Y. Mao, M.-Q. Huang, W.-J. Zhang,
et al., Physical Review Letters 117, 190501 (2016).
[53] C. Wang, Z.-Q. Yin, S. Wang, W. Chen, G.-C. Guo, and
Z.-F. Han, Optica 4, 1016 (2017).
[54] M. Curty, F. Xu, W. Cui, C. C. W. Lim, K. Tamaki, and
H.-K. Lo, Nature communications 5, 3732 (2014).
[55] F. Xu, H. Xu, and H.-K. Lo, Physical Review A 89,
052333 (2014).
[56] Z.-W. Yu, Y.-H. Zhou, and X.-B. Wang, Physical Review
A 91, 032318 (2015).
[57] Y.-H. Zhou, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-B. Wang, Physical Review
A 93, 042324 (2016).
[58] C. Jiang, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-B. Wang, Physical Review A
95, 032325 (2017).
[59] S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani, and L. Banchi,
Nature communications 8, 15043 (2017).
[60] M. Takeoka, S. Guha, and M. M. Wilde, Nature commu-
nications 5, 5235 (2014).
[61] M. Lucamarini, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J.
Shields, Nature 557, 400 (2018).
[62] X.-B. Wang, X.-L. Hu, and Z.-W. Yu, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1805.02272 (2018).
[63] X.-B. Wang, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-L. Hu, Physical Review
A 98, 062323 (2018).
[64] K. Tamaki, H.-K. Lo, W. Wang, and M. Lucamarini,
arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.05511 (2018).
[65] X. Ma, P. Zeng, and H. Zhou, Physical Review X 8,
031043 (2018).
[66] C. Cui, Z.-Q. Yin, R. Wang, W. Chen, S. Wang, G.-C.
Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Physical Review Applied 11, 034053
(2019).
[67] M. Curty, K. Azuma, and H.-K. Lo, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1807.07667 (2018).
[68] Z.-W. Yu, X.-L. Hu, C. Jiang, H. Xu, and X.-B. Wang,
Scientific Reports 9, 3080 (2019).
[69] F.-Y. Lu, Z.-Q. Yin, C.-H. Cui, G.-J. Fan-Yuan, S. Wang,
D.-Y. He, W. Chen, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1901.04264 (2019).
[70] M. Minder, M. Pittaluga, G. Roberts, M. Lucamarini,
J. Dynes, Z. Yuan, and A. Shields, Nature Photonics p. 1
(2019).
[71] Y. Liu, Z.-W. Yu, W. Zhang, J.-Y. Guan, J.-P. Chen,
C. Zhang, X.-L. Hu, H. Li, T.-Y. Chen, L. You, et al.,
arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.06268 (2019).
[72] S. Wang, D.-Y. He, Z.-Q. Yin, F.-Y. Lu, C.-H. Cui,
W. Chen, Z. Zhou, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1902.06884 (2019).
[73] X. Zhong, J. Hu, M. Curty, L. Qian, and H.-K. Lo, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1902.10209 (2019).
[74] J. Mu¨ller-Quade and R. Renner, New Journal of Physics
11, 085006 (2009).
[75] R. Renner, Ph.D. thesis, SWISS FEDERAL INSTI-
TUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ZURICH (2005).
[76] R. Ko¨nig, R. Renner, A. Bariska, and U. Maurer, Physi-
cal Review Letters 98, 140502 (2007).
[77] M. Tomamichel, C. C. W. Lim, N. Gisin, and R. Renner,
Nature communications 3, 634 (2012).
[78] M. Tomamichel, R. Colbeck, and R. Renner, IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory 56, 4674 (2010).
[79] A. Vitanov, F. Dupuis, M. Tomamichel, and R. Ren-
ner, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 59, 2603
(2013).
[80] M. Tomamichel and R. Renner, Physical review letters
106, 110506 (2011).
[81] H. Chernoff et al., The Annals of Mathematical Statistics
23, 493 (1952).
